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Abstract 
If you use P = 0.05 to suggest that you have made a discovery, you’ll be wrong at least 30% of the 
time.  If, as is often the case, experiments are under-powered, you’ll be wrong most of the time.  This 
conclusion is demonstrated from several points of view. First, tree diagrams which show the close 
analogy with the screening test problem. Similar conclusions are drawn by repeated simulations of t 
tests.  These mimic what’s done in real life, which makes the results more persuasive   The simulation 
method is used also to evaluate the extent to which effect sizes are over-estimated, especially in 
under-powered experiments. A script is supplied to allow the reader to do simulations themselves, 
with numbers appropriate for their own work.  It is concluded that if you wish to keep your false 
discovery rate below 5%, you need to use a 3-sigma rule, or to insist on P ≤ 0.001.  And never use the 
word “significant”. 
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'. • • before anything was known of Lydgate's skill, the 
judgements on it had naturally been divided, 
depending on a sense of likelihood, situated perhaps 
in the pit of the stomach or in the pineal gland, and 
differing in its verdicts, but not less valuable as a guide 
in the total deficit of evidence. 'George Eliot 
(Middlemarch, Chap. 45) 
 “The standard approach in teaching, of stressing the 
formal definition of a p-value while warning against its 
misinterpretation, has simply been an abysmal failure”  
Sellke et al. (2001) `  
Introduction 
There has been something of a crisis in science. It has 
become apparent that an alarming number of 
published results can’t be reproduced by other people.  
That’s what caused John Ioannidis to write his now 
famous paper, Why Most Published Research 
Findings Are False (Ioannidis, 2005).  That sounds 
very strong.  But in some areas of science it is 
probably right.  One contribution to this sad state of 
affairs must be the almost universal failure of 
biomedical papers to appreciate what governs the 
false discovery rate. 
In 1971, my point of view was that  
“the function of significance tests is to prevent you 
from making a fool of yourself, and not to make 
unpublishable results publishable” (Colquhoun, 1971). 
(Now, of course, one appreciates better the 
importance of publishing all results, whether negative 
or positive.) 
You make a fool of yourself if you declare that you 
have discovered something, when all you are 
observing is random chance.  From this point of view, 
what matters is the probability that, when you find that 
a result is “statistically significant”, there is actually a 
real effect.  If you find a “significant” result when there 
is nothing but chance at play, your result is a false 
positive, and the chance of getting a false positive is 
often alarmingly high.  This probability will be called 
false discovery rate in this paper. It’s also often called 
the error rate.   
You can also make a fool of yourself if you fail to 
detect a real effect, though that is less bad for your 
reputation.  
The false discovery rate is the complement of the 
positive predictive value (PPV) which is the probability 
that, when you get a “significant” result there is actually 
a real effect.  So, for example, if the false discovery 
rate is 70%, the PPV is 30%.  The false discovery rate 
is a more self-explanatory term so it will be preferred 
here. 
If you are foolish enough to define “statistically 
significant” as anything less than P = 0.05 then, 
according to one argument  (Sellke et al., 2001) ), you 
have a 29% chance (at least) of making a fool of 
yourself.  Who would take a risk like that?  Judging by 
the medical literature, most people would. No wonder 
there is a problem. 
The problems can be explained easily without using 
any equations, so equations are confined to the 
appendix, for those who appreciate their beauty.  
Before talking about significance tests, it will be helpful 
to reiterate the problem of false discovery rate in 
screening tests. Although this has had much publicity 
recently, it is not widely appreciated that very similar 
arguments lead to the conclusion that tests of 
significance are misinterpreted in most of the 
biomedical literature.  
 
The screening problem 
The argument about false positives in significance 
testing is closely related to the argument about false 
positives in diagnostic tests.  The latter may be a bit 
more familiar, so let’s deal with it first. 
Imagine a test for which 95 percent of people without 
the condition will be correctly diagnosed as not having 
it (specificity = 0.95).  That sounds pretty good.  
Imagine too, that the test is such that four out of five 
people with the condition will be detected by this test 
(sensitivity = 0.8).   This sounds like a reasonably good 
test. These numbers are close to those that apply for a 
rapid screening test for Alzheimer’s disease, proposed 
by Scharre et al. (2014).  Or, rather, it’s a test for mild 
cognitive impairment, MCI, which may or may not 
develop into dementia.  It’s been proposed that 
everyone should get dementia screening. Is this 
sensible?  One could argue that even if the test were 
perfect, screening would be undesirable because there 
are no useful treatments.  But it turns out that the test 
is almost useless anyway.  We need to know one more 
thing to find the false discovery rate, namely the 
prevalence of MCI in the population to be screened. 
For the whole population this is just over 1% (or about 
5% for people over 60).  Now we can construct the 
diagram in Fig 1. 
If we screen 10,000 people, 100 (1%) will have MCI, 
and 9,900 (99%) will not.  Of the 9,900 people who 
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don’t have MCI, 9,405 (95%) will be cleared, correctly, 
but 495 (5%) will give, incorrectly, a positive test.   
 
 
Figure 1  Tree diagram to illustrate the false discovery rate 
in screening tests.  This example is for a prevalence of 1%, 
specificity 95% and sensitivity 80%. Out of 10,000 people 
screened, 495+80 = 575 give positive tests. Of these 495 are 
false positives so the false discovery rate is 86%. 
 
Of the 100 people who have MCI, 80 (80%) will be 
detected, and 20 will be missed. So altogether, 495 + 
80 = 575 people will test positive, of which 495 are 
false positives.  Of these 495 are false positives so the 
false discovery rate is 495/575 = 86%.  Thus, if you 
test positive, the probability that you really do have 
MCI is only 80/575 = 13.8%.  The test had 80% 
sensitivity and 95% specificity, but it is clearly useless: 
the false discovery rate of 86% is disastrously high.  
As pointed out by McCartney (2013), that doesn’t 
seem to be understood by those who urge mass 
screening.   
 
The significance test problem 
The main reason for discussing screening here was to 
provide an easily understood introduction to the topic 
of this paper, the hazards of significance testing. 
It is still very common practice to regard P = 0.05 as 
the cut off between a significant and not-significant 
result.  Of course that is entirely arbitrary, and, in my 
view, a 5% probability of making a fool of myself is too 
high.  Nevertheless the practice is widespread so let’s 
stick with it for now.  The problem turns out to be much 
worse than a 5% error rate. 
 
First let’s get clear exactly what P = 0.05 means.  It 
isn’t common to get an accurate answer to that 
question. It will make life easier if we put the question 
in terms of a simple example.  Suppose that a 
treatment and a placebo are allocated at random to a 
group of people.  We measure the mean response to 
each treatment, and wish to know whether or not the 
observed difference between the means is real (not 
zero), or whether it could plausibly have arisen by 
chance. If the result of a significance test is P = 0.05 
we can make the following statement 
If there were actually no effect (if the true difference 
between means were zero) then the probability of 
observing a value for the difference equal to, or greater 
than, that actually observed would be P = 0.05.  In 
other words there is a 5% chance of seeing a 
difference at least as big as we have done, by chance 
alone.   
Of course the number will be right only if all the 
assumptions made by the test were true.  Note that the 
assumptions include the proviso that subjects were 
assigned randomly to one or the other of the two 
groups that are being compared.  This assumption 
alone means that significance tests are invalid in a 
large proportion of cases in which they are used.  
Here, however, we shall deal only with the perfect 
case of properly randomized, bias-free tests. 
If this P value is low enough, it seems reasonable to 
reject the premise that the difference is zero, and 
assert that there is a real difference.   
At first sight, it might be thought that this procedure 
would guarantee that you would make a fool of 
yourself only once in every 20 times that you do a test.  
But it implies nothing of the sort, and here’s why. 
Reasonable though the argument above may seem, a 
bit of thought shows that the question can be put in a 
different way.  Paraphrasing Sellke et al. (2001),  
“knowing that the data are ‘rare’ when there is no true 
difference is of little use unless one determines 
whether or not they are also ‘rare’ when there is a true 
difference” 
In order to avoid making a fool of yourself you need to 
know how often you are right when you declare a 
result to be significant, and how often you are wrong.  
In this context, being wrong means that you declare a 
result to be real when the true value of the difference is 
actually zero, i.e. when the treatment and placebo are 
really identical.  We can call this our false discovery 
rate, or our false positive rate.  This is not 5%, but a lot 
bigger. 
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At this point I should clarify that this paper is not about 
multiple comparisons. It’s well known that high false 
discovery rates occur when many outcomes of a single 
intervention are tested.   This has been satirised as the 
“jelly bean” problem (http://xkcd.com/882/ ).  Despite 
its notoriety it is still widely ignored.  There exist 
several methods that compensate for the errors that 
occur as a result of making multiple comparisons.  The 
best known is the Bonferroni correction, but arguably 
that method sets a criterion that is too harsh, and runs 
an excessive risk of not detecting true effects (it has 
low power).  In contrast, the method of Benjamini and 
Hochberg (1995) is based on setting a limit on the 
false discovery rate, and this is generally preferable. 
However this paper is not concerned with multiple 
comparisons.  It deals only with the very simplest ideal 
case.  We ask how to interpret a single P value, the 
outcome of a test of significance.  All of the 
assumptions of the test are true. The distributions of 
errors are precisely gaussian and randomisation of 
treatment allocations was done perfectly.  The 
experiment has a single pre-defined outcome.  The 
fact that, even in this ideal case, the false discovery 
rate can be alarmingly high means that there is a real 
problem for experimenters.  Any real experiment can 
only be less perfect than the simulations discussed 
here, and the possibility of making a fool of yourself by 
claiming falsely to have made a discovery can only be 
even greater than we find in this paper. 
The simplest way you can estimate your false 
discovery rate is very easy to follow. 
The classical P value does exactly what it says.  But it 
is a statement about what would happen if there were 
no true effect.  That can’t tell you about your long-term 
probability of making a fool of yourself, simply because 
sometimes there really is an effect.  In order to do the 
calculation we need to know a few more things.   
First we need to know the probability that the test will 
give the right result when there is a real effect.  This is 
called the power of the test.  The power depends on 
the sample size, and on the size of the effect we hope 
to detect. When calculating sample sizes it is 
commonly set to 0.8, so when there is a real effect, 
we’ll detect it (declare the result to be ‘significant’) in 
80% of tests.  (Clearly it would be better to have 99% 
but that would often mean using an unfeasibly large 
sample size.)   The power of the significance test is the 
same thing as the sensitivity of a screening test. 
There is one other thing that we need to specify in 
order to calculate the false discovery rate. We must 
take a guess at the fraction of tests that we do in which 
there is a real difference.  Of course we can’t usually 
know this, and the value will depend, among other 
things, on how good we are at guessing what 
experiments to do.   
For example, if the tests were on a series of 
homeopathic “remedies”, none would have a real 
difference because the treatment pills would be 
identical with the placebo pills.  In this case every test 
that came out ‘significant’ would be a false positive so 
our false discovery rate would be 100%. 
More realistically, imagine that we are testing a lot of 
candidate drugs, one at a time. It’s sadly likely that 
many of them would not work, so let’s imagine that 
10% of them work and the rest are inactive.  
We can work out the consequences of these numbers 
exactly as we did for the screening problem.  This is 
shown in Fig 2.   
Imagine that over a period of time you do 1000 tests.  
Of these, 100 (10%) will have real effects, and 900 
(90%) will be cases where there is no real effect. 
 
Figure 2 Tree diagram to illustrate the false discovery rate 
in significance tests.  This example considers 1000 tests, in 
which the prevalence of real effects is 10%.  The lower limb 
shows that with the conventional significance level, P = 0.05, 
there will be 45 false positives.  The upper limb shows that 
there will be 80 true positive tests.  The false discovery rate 
is therefore 45/(45+80) = 36%, far bigger than 5%. 
If we consider the 900 tests where there is no real 
effect (the null hypothesis is really true) then, 
according to the classical theory, 45 tests (5% of them) 
will be false positives (lower limb in Fig 2).  So you 
might imagine that the false discovery rate is 5%.  It 
isn’t, because in order to work out the fraction of 
positive tests that give the wrong result, we need to 
know the total number of positive tests.   
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To find this we need to look also at the upper limb in 
Fig 2.  In the 100 tests (10%) where there is a real 
effect (the null hypothesis is false), the effect will be 
correctly detected in 80 (80%) but 20 tests will fail to 
detect the effect (false negatives). 
Thus the total number of positive tests is 80 + 45 = 
125. Of these, 45 are false positives.  So In the long 
run, your chance of making a fool of yourself by 
declaring a result to be real when it isn’t will be 45/125 
= 36%.   
This false discovery rate is far bigger than 5%.  It may 
go some way to explain why so many false positive 
tests corrupt the literature, 
The approach that has just been described is 
sometimes described as Bayesian but notice that all 
the probabilities that are involved can be expressed in 
terms of long-run probabilities. It can be regarded as 
an exercise in conditional probabilities.  The 
description ‘Bayesian’ is not wrong but it is not 
necessary. 
 
A few more complications 
The argument outlined above is simple.  It shows there 
is a problem, but doesn’t provide all the answers.  
Once we go a bit further, we get into regions where 
statisticians disagree with each other. 
It is difficult to give a consensus of informed opinion 
because, although there is much informed opinion, 
there is rather little consensus. A personal view follows 
(Colquhoun, 1971). 
An easy way to test these problems is to simulate a 
series of tests to see what happens in the long run.  
This is easy to do and a script is supplied (Colquhoun, 
2014b), in the R language.  This makes it quick to 
simulate 100,000 t tests (that takes about 3.5 min on 
my laptop). It’s convincing because it mimics real life. 
Again we’ll consider the problem of using a Student’s t 
test to test whether there is a real difference between 
the means of two groups of observations.  For each 
test two groups of simulated ‘observations’ are 
generated as random variables with specified means 
and standard deviations.  The variables are normally 
distributed, so the assumptions of the t tests are 
exactly fulfilled. 
When the true means of both groups are the same, the 
true mean difference between the means is zero.  The 
distribution of the differences for 100,000 such tests is 
shown in Fig 3a.  As expected, the average difference 
is close to zero. In this example each group had 16 
observations with a standard deviation of 1 for both 
group, so the standard deviation for each mean (the 
standard error) is 1/√16) = 0.25, and the standard 
deviation of the difference between them is √(0.25
2
 + 
0.25
2
) = 0.354.  If the observations follow a normal 
(gaussian) distribution, and we use P = 0.05 as the 
threshold for ‘significance’, then we find that 5% of the 
tests will be ‘significant’, and all of these are false 
positives.  This is all we need to know for the classical 
approach.   
The distribution of the 100,000 P values generated is 
shown in Fig 3b: 5% of them (5000 values) are indeed 
below P = 0.05, but note that the distribution is flat (in 
statisticians’ jargon, the distribution of P values under 
the null hypothesis is uniform).  So there is the same 
number of P values between 0.55 and 0.6, and in 
every other interval of the same width.  This means 
that P values are not at all reproducible: all values of P 
are equally likely. 
 
Figure 3  Results of 100,000 simulated t tests, when the 
null hypothesis is true. The test looks at the difference 
between the means of two groups of observations which 
have identical true means, and a standard deviation of 1.  Fig 
3a shows the distribution os the 100,000 ‘observed’ 
differences between means (it is centred on zero and has a 
standard deviation of 0.354). Fig 3b shows the distribution of 
the 100,000 P values. As expected. 5% of the tests give 
(false) positives (P  ≤  0.05), but the distribution is flat 
(uniform). 
 
In order to complete the picture we need to consider 
also what happens when there is a real difference 
between the means.  Suppose that the treatment 
group has a true mean that is greater than that of the 
control group by 1, so the true mean difference 
between groups is 1.  The distributions of observations 
for control (blue) and treatment (red) groups are shown 
in Fig 4a.   
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Figure 4  The case where the null hypothesis is not true.  
Simulated t tests are based on samples from the postulated 
true distributions shown: blue = control group, red = 
treatment group.  The observations are supposed to be 
normally distributed with means that differ by one standard 
deviation, as shown in in Fig 4a.  The distributions of the 
means of 16 observations are shown in Fig 4b. 
 
We’ve supposed that both groups have the same 
standard deviation, set to 1 in this example.  (The 
exact numbers are not critical –the results will apply to 
any case where the true difference between means is 
one standard deviation.)  The distributions for control 
and treatment groups show considerable overlap, but 
the means of 16 observations are less scattered. Their 
standard deviation is 1/√16 = 0.25.   
 
Figure 5   Results of 100,000 simulated t tests in the case 
where the null hypothesis is not true, but as shown in Fig 4.  
Fig 5a shows the distribution of the 100,000 ‘observed’ 
values for the differences between means of 16 observations 
test looks. It has a mean of 1, and a standard deviation of 
0.354.   Fig 5b shows the distribution of the 100,000 P 
values: 78% of them are equal to or less than 0.05 (as 
expected form the power of the tests). 
 
The overlap is not huge.  In fact the sample size of 16 
was calculated to make the power of the test close to 
0.8, so about 80% of real differences should be 
detected. 
Fig 5a shows that the ‘observed’ differences are 
indeed centred around 1. Fig 5b shows that the 
number of P values that are equal to, or less than, 
0.05, is 78%, as expected from the calculated power, 
0.78 (there is a power calculator at 
http://www.stat.ubc.ca/~rollin/stats/ssize/n2.html ).  In 
other words, 78% of tests give the correct result. 
If we look at the average effect size for all those 
‘experiments’ for which P ≤ 0.05, it is 1.14 rather than 
1.0.  The measured effect size is too big (see Fig 7), 
and this happens because experiments that have, by 
chance, a larger than average effect size are more 
likely to be found ‘significant’ than those that happen to 
have small effect size. 
 
The false discovery rate in the simulated t tests 
In order to work out the long-term chance of making a 
fool of yourself, we must postulate the fraction of 
experiments that we do where there is a true effect 
(e.g. a true difference between means in the 
simulations just described).  This has already been 
done in a simple way in the tree diagram, in Figure 2.  
It is the equivalent of the prevalence in the screening 
example.  Similar inferences can be made from the 
simulations.  For the tree diagram we considered the 
case where 10% of all the experiments we do have 
real effects and 90% have no effects.  We can take 
90% of the simulations that had no true effect (Fig 3) 
and combine them with 10% of the simulations for 
which there was a true effect (Figs 4, 5).  In 100,000 
simulations, there are 5000 (5%) of false positives (P ≤ 
0.05) in Fig 3, and in Fig 5 there are 78,000 (78%) of 
(true) positives.  Combining these gives 0.9 × 5,000 + 
0.1 × 78,000 = 12,300 positive tests (i.e. those with P ≤ 
0.05), of which 5,000 are false positives.  Therefore, if 
a positive test is observed, the probability that it is a 
false positive is (0.9 × 5,000) / 12,300 = 0.36. 
Thus, you make a fool of yourself 36% of the time in 
this case, as inferred from the tree diagram in Fig 2.  
The false discovery rate is 36%, not 5%.  The 
appendix shows how this number can be calculated 
from an equation, but there is no need for an equation 
to get the result. The R script (Colquhoun, 2014b) can 
be used to do simulations with your own numbers. 
If we use a different postulate about the fraction of 
experiments in which there is no real effect, we get a 
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different result.  For example, if we assume that there 
is a real effect in half the experiments we do, rather 
than in 10% of them, the example just used, only 6% 
of tests would be false positives, not much different 
from the P value of 0.05.  So in this particular case 
there seems to be no problem.  This doesn’t get us off 
the hook, though, for three reasons. One reason is that 
there is no reason to think that half the tests we do in 
the long run will have genuine effects.  Another reason 
is connected with the rather subtle question of whether 
or not we should include P ≤ 0.05 in the calculation, 
when we have observed P = 0.05.  The third reason is 
that underpowered studies show a false discovery 
bigger than 0.05 even when there are 50% of 
experiments with genuine effects.  These questions 
will be considered next. 
Notice that if every experiment we ever did had a 
genuine effect then all positive tests would be correct 
and the false discovery rate would be zero.  Notice 
also that the tree diagram shows that 98% of negative 
tests give the right result: false negatives are rare. But 
that’s not surprising because 90% of tests there really 
is no effect, so there’s a good chance that a negative 
test will be right.  If there were no real effects at all, as 
in the homeopathic example, then 100% of negative 
tests would be right. 
 
Underpowered studies 
The case just described is unusually good.  In practice 
many published results have a power far less than 0.8.  
Values around 0.5 are common, and 0.2 is far from 
rare. Over half a century ago, Cohen (1962) found 
“ . . . that the average power (probability of rejecting 
false null hypotheses) over the 70 research studies 
was 0.18 for small effects, 0.48 for medium effects, 
and 0.83 for large effects.” 
He was talking about social psychology.  He was 
largely ignored, despite the fact that many papers 
appeared in the statistical literature that discussed the 
problem. 
Half a century later, Button et al. (2013) said 
“We optimistically estimate the median statistical 
power of studies in the neuroscience field to be 
between about 8% and about 31%” 
This is disastrously low.  It is no better than it was 50 
years ago.  That’s because many effects are quite 
small, and inadequate sample sizes are used, and 
because the warnings of statisticians have been 
ignored. 
We can easily look at the consequences of low power 
either from tree diagrams as in Fig 2, or by simulating 
many t tests.  The examples of t tests shown in Figs 3 
– 5 were simulated with 16 observations in each 
group. That was enough to give a power of 0.78, close 
to the value often used in the design of clinical trials.  If 
we use only 8 observations in each group, the power 
of the test falls to 0.46 and with 4 observations in each 
group, the power is only 0.22, so there is only a 22% 
chance of detecting a real effect when it’s there.  Sadly 
values like these, though obviously unsatisfactory, are 
only too common.   
The distribution of the ‘observed’ P values for a power 
of 0.22 is shown in Fig 6.  It’s far more spread out than 
in Fig. 5b, with only 22% of P values equal to or less 
than 0.05, as would be expected from the power of the 
tests.  If a ‘significant’ test occurs, the next test will be 
‘not significant’ in 78% of cases.  Again we see that P 
values are not at all reproducible. The fact that the P 
value will often differ greatly when the experiment is 
repeated is sometimes used as a criticism of the whole 
P value approach.  In fact it’s to be expected and the 
conventional tests do exactly what it says on the tin.  
This phenomenon is illustrated graphically in the 
Dance of the P Values 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ez4DgdurRPg ) 
 
 
Figure 6.  Distribution of 100,000 P values from tests like 
those in Fig 5, but with only 4 observations in each group, 
rather than 16.  The calculated power of the tests is only 0.22 
in this case, and it’s found, as expected, that 22% of the P 
values are equal to or less than 0.05. 
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The inflation effect 
If you do manage to get a positive ‘significant’ 
difference (P ≤ 0.05) with a power of 0.46, and you 
look at the size of the effect for those results for that 
are ‘significant’, it comes out as about 1.4.  And with a 
power of 0.22 it comes out as about 1.8 (both are 
bigger than the true difference between means of 1.0).    
In other words, not only do you mostly fail to detect the 
true effect, but even when you do (correctly) spot it, 
you get its size wrong.  The inflation effect gets really 
serious when the power is low.  The estimated effect 
size is almost twice its true value with a power around 
0.2.  That’s because the test is more likely to be 
positive in the small number of experiments that show 
a larger than average effect size.  The effect inflation, 
as a function of power (or of the number of 
observations in each group), is plotted in Fig 7. 
There is no simple way to calculate the size of the 
effect inflation, but the R script (Colquhoun, 2014b) 
allows you to estimate the effect inflation for numbers 
that are appropriate for your problem 
 
 
Figure 7 The average difference between means for all 
tests that came out with P ≤ 0.05. Each point was found from 
100,000 simulated t tests, with data as in Fig 4.  The power 
of the tests was varied by changing the number, n, of   
‘observations’ that were averaged for each mean.  This 
varied from n = 3 (power = 0.157) for the leftmost point, to n 
= 50 (power = 0.9986) for the rightmost point.  Intermediate 
points were calculated with n = 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 and 
20. 
 
Most seriously of all though, your chance of making a 
fool of yourself increases enormously when 
experiments are underpowered.  Even in the best 
case, where half your experiments have a true effect, 
you’ll make a fool of yourself by claiming an effect is 
real when it’s not in about 10% of cases for a power of 
0.5 (sample size of n = 8 in the simulations), and in 
20% of tests for a power of 0.2 (n = 4 in the 
simulations).  If only 10% of your experiments have a 
true effect, as illustrated in Figure 2, you’ll make a fool 
of yourself in almost 50% of cases when the power is 
about 0.5, and in a staggering 70% of cases when the 
power is only 0.2. 
The spreadsheet with the results for simulated t tests, 
and the R programme that allows you to run them 
yourself, are available (Colquhoun, 2014b). 
 
Two more approaches 
It is already clear that if you use P = 0.05 as a magic 
cut off point, you are very likely to make a fool of 
yourself by claiming a real effect when there is none. 
This is particularly the case when experiments are 
underpowered.  In every case we’ve looked at so far, 
the probability of incorrectly declaring an effect to be 
real has been greater than 5%. It’s varied from 6% to a 
disastrous 70%, depending on the power of the test, 
and depending on the proportion of experiments we do 
over a lifetime in which there is a real effect: the 
smaller this proportion, the worse the problem.   
It’s easy to see why this happens.  If many of the tests 
you do have no real effect then the large number of 
false positives they generate overwhelms the number 
of true positives that come from the small number of 
experiments where there is a genuine effect. 
All the results so far have referred to conventional 
tests of significance in which you claim to have 
discovered a real effect when you observe P ≤ 0.05 (or 
some other specified value).  The results are already 
alarming.  But there is another subtlety to be 
considered. 
What happens if we consider P = 0.05, rather than 
P ≤ 0.05 ?  
One conventionally declares a result to be ‘significant’ 
if P is equal to or less than 0.05 (or some other 
specified value).  Thus P = 0.047 would be described 
as “significant” in the classical Fisherian method.  
Some statisticians would say that, once you have 
observed, say, P = 0.047, that is part of the data so we 
should not include the or less than bit.  That is 
indisputable if we are trying to interpret the meaning of 
a single test that comes out with P = 0.047.  To 
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interpret this we need to see what happens in an 
imaginary series of experiments that all come out with 
P near to 0.05. 
It’s easy to see what happens by using repeated 
simulations of t tests, as above, but this time we 
restrict attention to only those tests that come out 
close to 0.05. We run the same simulations as before, 
but rather than looking at all experiments for which P is 
0.05 or less, we confine our attention to only those 
experiments that come out with a P value between 
0.045 and 0.05.  Arguably, this is what we need to do 
in order to interpret a single experiment that produces 
P = 0.047.   
When we run the simulations for tests with reasonable 
power (a sample size of n = 16, giving power near to 
80%, as in Figs 2 – 5), when there is a real effect of 
the size illustrated in Fig 4, we find that out of 100,000  
tests, 1424 come out with a P value between 0.045 
and 0.05 (true positives).  And when we run the 
simulations again, with no real effects (the true mean 
difference between treatment and control and control 
is zero), we find that 511 tests come out with a P value 
between 0.045 and 0.05 (false positives).  So there are 
1935 positive tests, of which 511 (26%) are false 
positives.  This is the most optimistic case, in which 
the power is adequate and it’s assumed that half your 
experiments have a true effect and half didn’t. 
Thus, if you observe a P value close to 0.05 and 
declare that you’ve discovered a real effect, you’ll 
make a fool of yourself 26% of the time, even in the 
most optimistic case. 
Interestingly, this percentage doesn’t change much 
when tests are underpowered (it’s already a 
disastrously high false discovery rate). 
If we look at the case where most (90%) of 
experiments have no real effect, as in Fig 2, the 
outcome gets even worse.  If we look at only those 
experiments that give a P value between 0.045 and 
0.05 we find that in 76% of these ‘just significant’ 
experiments, there was in fact no real effect: the null 
hypothesis was true. Again, this number is almost 
independent of power. 
The outcome is that if you declare that you’ve made a 
discovery when you observe a P value close to 0.05, 
you have at the least a 26% chance of being wrong, 
and often a much bigger chance.  Yet many results get 
published for which the false discovery rate is at least 
30%.  No wonder there is a problem of reproducibility. 
These statements refer only to tests that come out 
close to 0.05, so they don’t tell you about the number 
of times you make a fool of yourself over a lifetime (not 
all your results will be close to 0.05), but they do 
indicate that observation of P close to 0.05 tells you 
remarkably little about whether or not you’ve made a 
discovery. 
 
Berger’s approach 
In order to do these calculations we’ve had to 
postulate the prevalence of tests that we do in which 
there is in fact a genuine effect (null hypothesis 
untrue).  We have seen that even in the most 
optimistic case, in which prevalence is 0.5, the false 
discovery rate is alarmingly high.  A Bayesian would 
refer to the prevalence as the prior probability that 
there is a real effect.  There is no need to describe it in 
this way.  It’s a normal frequentist probability, which 
could, in principle, be estimated by sufficiently rigorous 
tests.  
The problem with asking a Bayesian about what to do 
is that you may get as many different answers as there 
are Bayesians.  James Berger devised an ingenious 
solution to this problem (Berger & Sellke,.1987; Sellke 
et al., 1981).  He gave a result that applies regardless 
of what the shape of the prior distribution might be.  In 
effect, it chooses the prior distribution that is most 
favourable to the hypothesis that there is a real effect.  
Using this one can calculate the minimum false 
discovery rate that corresponds to any observed P 
value.  For P = 0.05 the false discovery rate calculated 
in this way is 0.289.   This is a minimum value.  It 
means that if you observe a P value that is close to 
0.05, there is at least a 29% chance that there is in fact 
no real effect.  This result is quite close to the false 
discovery rates that were inferred from the simulated t 
tests above, when we confined our attention to 
experiments that gave P values between 0.045 and 
0.05.  More information is given in the Appendix. 
If you believe that it’s unacceptable to make a fool of 
yourself 30% of the time, what should you do?   
According to Berger’s approach, a P value close to 
0.001 corresponds to a false discovery rate of 1.84 
percent (see appendix).  If you believe that it’s 
tolerable to take a 1.8 percent risk of making a fool of 
yourself, then you don’t claim to have discovered a 
real effect in an experiment that gives P bigger than 
0.001. 
This procedure amounts roughly to adopting a 3-sigma 
policy, rather than a 2-sigma rule.  Two standard 
deviations from the mean excludes about 5% of the 
area under a normal distribution (2.5% in each tail), 
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and that’s what happens when you use P = 0.05.  
Three standard deviations from the mean excludes 
0.27% of the area.  Berger’s calibration suggests that 
P = 0.0027 corresponds to a false discovery rate of 
0.042, not far from the 0.05 level that is customarily 
abused. 
 
Is the argument Bayesian? 
The way that you predict the risk of getting a false 
positive is often described as being an application of 
Bayes’ theorem.  There is a fascinating argument 
among statisticians about the practical use of Bayes’ 
theorem.  The argument started after Bayes’ results 
were published in 1764, and it rages on still.  One of 
the controversial bits about using Bayesian methods is 
the necessity to abandon the easy definition of 
probability as a long run frequency, and instead to 
consider it as subjective betting odds. The other is the 
need to specify how strong your belief in the outcome 
is before the experiment is done (a prior probability), 
an exercise that can come dangerously close to 
feeding your prejudices into the result.   
Luckily, though, it isn’t necessary to get involved in any 
of these subtleties.  
I maintain that the analysis here may bear a formal 
similarity to a Bayesian argument, but is free of the 
more contentious parts of the Bayesian approach. The 
arguments that I have used contain no subjective 
probabilities, and are an application of obvious rules of 
conditional probabilities. 
The classical example of Bayesian argument is the 
assessment of the evidence of the hypothesis that the 
earth goes round the sun.  The probability of this 
hypothesis being true, given some data, must be 
subjective since it’s not possible to imagine a 
population of solar systems, some of which are 
heliocentric and some of which are not.  The solar 
system is either heliocentric or not: it can’t be 95% 
heliocentric. 
One can similarly argue that an individual drug either 
works or it doesn’t (disregarding some obvious 
assumptions that underlie that statement). But the 
need for subjective probabilities vanishes if we think of 
a lifetime spent testing a series of drugs, one at a time, 
to see whether or not their effects differ from a control 
group.  It’s easy to imagine a large number of 
candidate drugs some of which are active (fraction 
P(real) say) , some of which aren’t.  So the prevalence 
(or prior, if you must) is a perfectly well-defined 
probability, which could be determined with sufficient 
effort.  If you test one drug at random, the probability of 
it being active is P(real). It’s no different from the 
probability of picking a black ball from an urn that 
contains a fraction P(real) of black balls. to use the 
statisticians’ favourite example. 
That way of looking at the problem is exactly 
analogous with the case of screening tests, which 
certainly does not necessitate subjective probabilities 
 
Conclusions: what can be done? 
All of the approaches above suggest that if you use P 
= 0.05 as a criterion for claiming that you have 
discovered an effect you’ll make a fool of yourself at 
least 30% of the time.  This alone implies that many 
published claims are not true. 
It’s important to notice that the calculations described 
here are the most optimistic view possible.  They apply 
to properly designed tests in which treatments are 
randomly allocated to groups, there is no bias (e.g. 
assessments are blinded) and all negative results are 
published.  It is also assumed that there is a single 
pre-specified outcome, so there is no problem arising 
from multiple comparisons.  In real life, such perfect 
experiments are rare.  It follows that 30% is very much 
a minimum for the proportion of published experiments 
which wrongly claim to have discovered an effect.  To 
that extent, Ioannidis’ assertion that “most published 
research findings are false” seems to be not unduly 
alarmist. 
The blame for the crisis in reproducibility has several 
sources. 
One of them is the self-imposed publish-or-perish 
culture (Colquhoun, 2011), which values quantity over 
quality, and which has done enormous harm to 
science. 
The mis-assessment of individuals by silly bibliometric 
methods has contributed to this harm. Of all the 
proposed methods, ’altmetrics’ is demonstrably the 
most idiotic Colquhoun & Plested, (2014a),  Yet some 
vice-chancellors have failed to understand that 
(Colquhoun, 2013b) 
Another cause of problems is scientists’ own vanity, 
which leads to the PR department issuing disgracefully 
hyped up press releases. (Colquhoun, 2013c) 
In some cases, the abstract of a paper even states that 
a discovery has been made when the data say the 
opposite. This sort of spin is common in the quack 
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world. Yet referees and editors get taken in by the ruse 
(e.g. see a study of acupuncture: Colquhoun, 2013a). 
The reluctance of many journals (and many authors) to 
publish negative results biases the whole literature in 
favour of positive results. This is so disastrous in 
clinical work that a pressure group has been started; 
altrials.net "All Trials Registered:  All Results 
Reported". 
Yet another problem is that it has become very hard to 
get grants without putting your name on publications to 
which you have made little contribution. This leads to 
exploitation of young scientists by older ones (who fail 
to set a good example).  It has led to a slave culture in 
which armies of post doctoral assistants are pushed 
into producing more and more papers for the glory of 
the boss and the university, so they don’t have time to 
learn the basics of their subject (including statistics).  
Peter Lawrence (2007) has set out the problems in 
The Mismeasurement of Science. 
And, most pertinent to this paper, a widespread failure 
to understand properly what a significance test means 
must contribute to the problem.  
Here are some things that can be done. 
 Notice that all statistical tests of significance 
assume that the treatments have been 
allocated at random. This means that 
application of significance tests to 
observational data, e.g. epidemiological 
surveys of diet and health, is not valid. You 
can’t expect to get the right answer. The 
easiest way to understand this assumption is 
to think about randomisation tests (which 
should have replaced t tests decades ago, but 
which are still rarely used). There is a simple 
introduction in Lectures on Biostatistics 
(Colquhoun. 1971, chapters 8 and 9). There 
are other assumptions too, about the 
distribution of observations, independence of 
measurements), but randomisation is the most 
important. 
 Never, ever, use the word "significant" in a 
paper. It is arbitrary, and, as we have seen, 
deeply misleading.  Still less should you use 
"almost significant", "tendency to significant" or 
any of the hundreds of similar circumlocutions 
listed by Matthew Hankins (2013) on his Still 
not Significant blog. 
 If you do a significance test, just state the P 
value and give the effect size and confidence 
intervals.  But be aware that 95% intervals 
may be misleadingly narrow, and they tell you 
nothing whatsoever about the false discovery 
rate.  Confidence intervals are just a better 
way of presenting the same information that 
you get from a P value. 
 Observation of a P value close to 0.05 means 
nothing more than ‘worth another look’. In 
practice, one’s attitude will depend on 
weighing the losses that ensue if you miss a 
real effect against the loss to your reputation if 
you claim falsely to have made a discovery. 
 Do some rough calculations of the sample size 
that might be needed to show a worthwhile 
effect, Underpowered studies still abound and 
contribute to both high false discovery rates 
and effect-size inflation. 
 If you want to avoid making a fool of yourself 
too often, don’t regard anything bigger than P 
< 0.001 as a demonstration that you’ve 
discovered something. Or, slightly less 
stringently, use a three-sigma rule. 
Similar conclusions have been reached, for similar 
reasons, by many others, e.g. Sterne & Davey Smith 
(2001) and Valen Johnson (2013). But they have been 
largely ignored by authors and editors. One exception 
to that is genome-wide association studies, which were 
notorious for false positive associations in the early 
days, but which have now learned the statistical lesson 
(e.g. Bush & Moore, 2012)   Nevertheless, the practice 
of labelling a difference between two values with an 
asterisk, and saying it’s a discovery is still rampant in 
the biomedical literature. No wonder so much of it is 
wrong. 
One must admit, however reluctantly, that despite the 
huge contributions that Ronald Fisher made to 
statistics, there is an element of truth in the conclusion 
of a perspicacious journalist 
“The plain fact is that 70 years ago Ronald Fisher gave 
scientists a mathematical machine for turning baloney 
into breakthroughs, and °flukes into funding. It is time 
to pull the plug”.  Robert Matthews Sunday Telegraph, 
13 September 1998. 
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APPENDIX 
All the calculations here are based on the rules of 
conditional probability (a simple introduction is given 
by Colquhoun, 1971, section 2.4).  The probability of 
observing both event A and event B (left hand term) 
can be written in two ways. 
𝑃(𝐴 ⋂ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)      (A1) 
P(A|B) is read as the probability of A given that B has 
occurred.  If A and B are independent, the probability 
of A occurring is the same whether or not B has 
occurred so P(A|B) is simply P(A) and eqn. A1 reduces 
to the multiplication rule of probability.  It follows from 
eq. A1 that 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
 
(A2) 
The screening example 
 
Define event A to mean you have the condition which 
is being screened for, so A = ill.  Define event B as 
meaning that your diagnostic test comes out positive.  
The probability that you are actually ill given that the 
test comes out positive, i.e. 
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠) =
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑖𝑙𝑙)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠)
 
The false discovery rate is therefore 
𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠) = 1 −
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑖𝑙𝑙)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠)
 
The probability that you test positive, P(B), can be 
expressed thus 
𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵|𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐴)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡𝐴) 
So the fraction of “significant’ tests in which you really 
are ill is 
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠)
=
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑖𝑙𝑙)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙)
 
(A3) 
And the false discovery rate is 
𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠)
=
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙)
 
This expresses, as an equation, exactly what we 
inferred from the tree diagram in Fig 1.  For example, 
in Fig 1 we postulated that the prevalence of MCI in 
the population is 1%, so 
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙) = 0.01 
𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙) = 0.99 
The sensitivity of the test was 80%, so 80% of people 
who have MCI will test positive 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑖𝑙𝑙) = 0.8 
The specificity of the test was 0.95. i.e. 95 percent of 
people without the condition will be correctly 
diagnosed as not having it 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑔|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙) = 0.95 
So 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑙) = 1 − 0.95 = 0.05 
Thus 
𝑃(𝑖𝑙𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠) =
0.01 × 0.8
0.01 × 0.8 + 0.05 × 0.99
= 0.139 
Thus the false discovery rate of the test is 1 - 0.139 = 
86.1% false positives, as found from the tree diagram 
in Fig 1. 
Significance tests.  
The argument is much the same as for screening. 
Denote as real the event that there is a real difference 
between test and control, i.e. the null hypothesis is 
false. This is the same as the prevalence, in the 
screening test calculations. So not real means the null 
hypothesis is true –there is no real effect.  Denote as 
test sig the event that the test indicates the result is 
‘significant’, i.e. comes out with P ≤ 0.05 (or whatever 
level is specified).  We can now work through the 
example in Fig 2 with equations.  From A2 
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔)
=
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) + 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)
 
(A4) 
As in Fig 2, suppose that, in a series of tests, 10% 
have real effects but in 90% the null hypothesis is true. 
Thus 
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) = 0.1 
𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) = 0.9 
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Say the power of the test is 0.8, so when there is a real 
effect it will be detected 80% of the time. 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) = 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 0.8 
And the conventional ‘significance’ level is 0.05, so 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) = 1 − 0.95 = 0.05 
Putting these values into eq. A4 
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔) =
0.1 × 0.8
0.1 × 0.8 + 0.05 × 0.90
= 0.64 
This is the same result that we got from the tree 
diagram in Fig 2.  Even for this well-powered test, the 
null hypothesis is true in 1 – 0.64 = 36% of tests that 
are declared ‘significant’.  That sort of false discovery 
rate means that you would make a fool of yourself in a 
bit more than 1 in 3 cases in which you claim to have 
discovered an effect. 
Bayes’ factor –posterior odds 
Another approach to deciding whether or not an effect 
is real is to look at the likelihood ratio.  This term 
likelihood, in its statistical sense, means probability of 
observing the data, given a hypothesis, I.e. the 
probability of observing the data if that hypothesis 
were true.  Say the two hypotheses to be compared 
are H0 and H1where H0 means that there is no real 
difference between treatment and control (the null 
hypothesis) and H1 means that there is a real 
difference.  The likelihood ratio is 
𝐵 =
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝐻0)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝐻1)
 
(this is also known as the Bayes’ factor, but there is no 
need to consider it as a Bayesian concept).  The 
bigger this is, the more the data favours the H1, the 
greater the likelihood that a real difference exists. 
It follows from A2 that the false discovery rate is 
𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔)
=
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) + 𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙)
 
Thus the odds ratio for H0 (versus H1) is the ratio of 
these two quantities, i.e. 
𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔)
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔 )
=
𝑃(𝐻0)
𝑃(𝐻1 )
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝐻0)
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝐻1 )
=
𝑃(𝐻0)
𝑃(𝐻1)
𝐵 
Thus the odds on H0 are given by the product of the 
prior odds, P(H0)/P(H1) and the likelihood ratio, B.  
Numerical example 
We’ll use, once again, the numbers that were used in 
Fig. 2.  The prior odds ratio is 
𝑃(𝐻0)
𝑃(𝐻1)
=
9
1
 
i.e. there is a 9 to one chance that the null hypothesis 
is true, so in 9/(9+1) = 90% of tests the null hypothesis 
is true, and in the remaining 10% there is a real effect 
to be discovered.  As before, using P = 0.05 as cut off 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝐻0) = 0.05 
And the power of the test is 0.8 
𝑃(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔|𝐻1) = 0.8 
The likelihood ratio for H0 versus H0 
𝐿 =
0.05
0.8
=
1
16
 
Thus 
𝑂𝑅 = 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑛 𝐻0 𝑣𝑠 𝐻1 =
9
1
0.05
0.8
= 0.5625 
So the odds that there is really an effect are less than 
2 to 1.  Put another way, the false discovery rate is 
𝑃(𝐻0|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔) = 𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙|𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑔) =
𝑂𝑅
1 + 𝑂𝑅
=
0.5625
1 + 0.5625
= 0.36 
Once again, we find a false discovery rate of 36%, far 
bigger than the P = 0.05 used for the test. 
 
The Berger approach 
James Berger and colleagues proposed to solve the 
problem of the unknown prior distribution by looking for 
a lower bound for the likelihood ratio (Bayes factor), for 
H0 relative to H1.  Expressed as a function of the 
observed P value, Sellke et al, (2001) suggest 
𝐵(𝑝) = −𝑒𝑃 log (𝑃) 
(this holds for P < 1/e, where e =  2.71828 . . .).  This is 
the smallest odds against the null hypothesis H0 that 
can be generated by any prior distribution, whatever its 
shape.  Therefore it is the choice that most favours the 
14 
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rejection of the null hypothesis.  The odds can be 
converted to an equivalent probability  
𝛼(𝑃) =
𝐵(𝑃)
1 + 𝐵(𝑃)
=
1
1 +
1
(−𝑒𝑃 log(𝑃))
 
(A5) 
For the case where the prior probability of having a 
real effect is P(H1) = P(H0) = 0.5, this can be 
interpreted as the minimum false discovery rate (Sellke 
et al., 2001).  It gives the minimum probability that, 
when a test is ‘significant’, the null hypothesis is true: 
i.e. it is an estimate of the minimum false discovery 
rate, or false positive rate.  Berger refers to it as the 
conditional error probability.  Some values are given in 
Table A1 
 
P 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.001 
(P) 0.465 0.385 0.289 0.111 0.067 0.0184 
Table A1   P values and their corresponding conditional 
error probabilities, (P), calculated from equation A5, as in 
(Sellke et al. 2001). 
 
The minimum false discovery rate for P = 0.05 is seen 
to be 0.289. In other words, if you claim you have 
discovered something when you observe a P value 
close to 0.05, you will make a fool of yourself in about 
30% of cases.   
In the example used in Fig 2 the false discovery rate 
was 36%, which is compatible with Berger’s result, but 
this isn’t strictly comparable, because Fig 2, and the 
first set of simulations looked at all tests which came 
out with P ≤ 0.05.  Berger’s approach concerns only 
those tests that come out close to the specified value, 
P = 0.05 in the example. In the second set of 
simulations we looked at tests that gave P values 
between 0.045 and 0.05.  These gave a false 
discovery rate of at least 26% (in the case where the 
prior probability of a real effect was 0.5) and a false 
discovery rate of 76% in the case, as in Fig 2, when 
only 10% of the experiments have a real effect.  These 
results are close to Berger’s assertion that the false 
discovery rate will be at least 29% regardless of what 
the prior distribution might be. 
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